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CRIMINAL LAW-HABEAS CORPUS-FOURTH
AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE CLAIMS
NEED NOT BE REVIEWED IN FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS WHERE FULLY AND FAIRLY
LITIGATED IN STATE COURTS
Stone v. Powell'
Respondent Powell was convicted of murder in a California state court.
Part of the evidence against him was a revolver discovered on his person in a
search incident to arrest for vagrancy by a Henderson, Nevada, police
officer. The officer testified as to the discovery of the revolver, and a
criminologist testified the revolver was the one used in the murder. Powell
contended the revolver and the police officer's testimony should have been
excluded because the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional. The trial
court rejected this contention. The conviction was upheld by California
courts and on habeas corpus review in United States district court.2 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding the vagrancy ordinance was unconsti3
tutionally vague and that admission of the evidence was not harmless error.
The state appealed.
In Wolff v. Rice,4 decided with Stone v. Powell, Rice had been convicted of
murder in a Nebraska state court. A police officer answering a distress call at
an Omaha street address was killed by a bomb explosion while examining a
suitcase in the doorway. Rice's conviction as a participant in the bombing plot
was based in part on evidence obtained from his home pursuant to a search
warrant. Rice contended the search was illegal and the evidence should have
been excluded because the affidavit supporting issuance of the search
warrant was defective. 5 His conviction was affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme Court 6 but was reversed on habeas corpus review by the United States
district court which agreed the warrant affidavit was defective.7 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed.8 The state appealed.
1. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
2. Id. at 3039-40.
3. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 95-97, 99 (9th Cir. 1974).
4. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
5. Id. at 3040-41.
6. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972).
7. Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185,190-94 (D.C. Neb. 1974). The district court
relied on Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964), in examining the affidavit on its face and concluding probable cause
was lacking. The United States Supreme Court noted that the Nebraska Supreme
Court had found probable cause by relying in part on additional information
brought out at a suppression hearing and that such a means of finding probable
cause previously had been rejected. 96 S. Ct. at 3041 n.3.
8. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975).
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The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell
supported by six of the nine justices, held that
. . . where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not
require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief
on the ground that evidence obtained in
an unconstitutional search
9
or seizure was introduced at his trial.
The rationale for the holding was -that the exclusionary rule is not a
constitutional right but rather a judge-made remedy designed to deter
police misconduct; in this context, allowing exclusionary rule claims to be
considered in habeas corpus proceedings does not serve a meaningful
deterrent function.' 0 Thus Powell's and Rice's convictions were allowed to
stand. 1 The Court stated there still would be habeas corpus jurisdiction over
fourth amendment claims as distinguished from the exclusionary rule. 12
Though the holding applies to state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1971), dictum in the case indicated the same result
will obtain where federal prisoners attempt to invoke the exclusionary rule
in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1971)." s
A brief history of federal habeas corpus will help put Stone v. Powell in
perspective. The landmark case of Brown v. Allen in 1953 held that federal
courts have the power to review all federal constitutional issues in habeas
corpus proceedings, even where a state court has ruled against the petitioner
on the federal claim.14 Ten years later Fay v. Noiaestablished that protection
of due process rights is a basic function of habeas corpus and that a
procedural default by the petitioner in state courts will not preclude habeas
corpus review unless the petitioner "deliberately by-passed" the state procedure. 15 At the same time Townsend v. Sain made it clear that a federal habeas
court is not bound to accept the state determination of facts and in any event
must always apply federal law independently of the state determination.' 6
9. 96 S. Ct. at 3046.
10. Id. at 3048-51.
11. The Court rejected respondents' contention that since the time for applying for certiorari had passed in their cases, restriction of the ability to obtain habeas
corpus review of search and seizure claims should be prospective. The Court noted
that while not required to do so under Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the
respondents were free to file a timely application for certiorari before seeking habeas
corpus review. 96 S. Ct. at 3052 n.38.
12. Id.at 3052 n.37. This might be interpreted as meaning fourth amendment
claims may be raised on habeas review not only where the issue was not fully and
fairly litigated in the state courts, but also in other unspecified situations. One
possibility might be that where police activities "shock the conscience" of civilized
society, evidence must be excluded under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
13. 96 S. Ct. at 3045 n.16.
14. 344 U.S. 443, 463-64, 478, 508 (1953).
15. 372 U.S. 391, 426-27, 438 (1963).
16. 372 U.S. 293, 312, 318 (1963).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/13
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Townsend also laid down standards for determining when the federal habeas
court should grant an evidentiary hearing.' 7 After Fay and Townsend the
Court did not expressly approve review of fourth amendment claims by state
prisoners in federal habeas corpus; however, several cases made it clear such
claims would be heard.' 8 In 1969 Kaufman v. United States held federal
prisoners could assert fourth amendment and exlcusionary rule claims in
habeas corpus proceedings and reaffirmed that state prisoners could do
19

SO.

The steady expansion in the scope of federal habeas corpus review has
not gone unopposed. There have been numerous proposals in Congress to
curtail the availability of the writ.2" A strong hint that the Supreme Court
itself might cut back the scope of habeas review, at least in search and seizure
2
cases, came in the 1973 case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. ' There Justice
Powell in a concurring opinion presaged his majority opinion in Stone v.
Powell by saying he would hold ".

.

. [F]ederal collateral review of a state

prisoner's Fourth Amendment claims. . . should be confined solely to the
question of whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise
and have adjudicated the question in state courts." This concurring opinion
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist22and was supported
by Justice Blackmun in a separate concurring opinion.
A brief history of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule also is
helpful in understanding Stone v. Powell. In the 1914 case of Weeks v. United
States the Court held evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the
17. The Court held that an evidentiary hearing must be granted to a habeas
applicant if:
...(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the
records as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts
were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any
reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313. It would appear that the holding in Fayv. Noia,text accompanying note 15
supra, is one example of the "full and fair" hearing principle set forth in Townsend.
The Townsend holding has additional significance in the fourth amendment
search and seizure area because so many search and seizure claims involve mixed
questions of law and fact, and the federal court must always decide questions of
federal law in habeas proceedings. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
18. E.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391
U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
19. 394 U.S. 217, 225-27 (1969).
20. 61 GEO. L.J. 1221 (1973). Assuming the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right, a statute proposed in 1973 would have had the same result as Stone v.
Powell by requiring habeas review to be based on rights whose purpose is to protect
the reliability of the state fact-finding process. S. 567, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
21. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
22. Id. at 249-50.
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fourth amendment ban on "unreasonable" searches would be excluded in
federal prosecutions.23 Thirty-five years later Wolf v. Colorado held that
while the fourth amendment applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, the states were not required to exclude evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment. 24 A few years later Rochin v. California
edged a bit closer to applying the exclusionary rule to the states in holding
that where police conduct in obtaining evidence in violation of the fourth
amendment "shocks the conscience," such evidence must be excluded at trial
under a due process concept.2 5 Finally, 47 years after Weeks, the Court held
in Mapp v. Ohio2 6 that the exclusionary rule is binding on the states. The rule
was described as of "constitutional origin" on the ground that without it the
fourth amendment would be reduced to a "form of words." The rule also
was justified as a deterrent to violations of the fourth amendment by
government officials and on the ground that exclusion of unlawfully seized
' 27
evidence is required by the "imperative of judicial integrity.
Since Mapp the exclusionary rule has come under increasing criticism
on the grounds that it does not in fact deter police misconduct and that it
often results in releasing guilty persons.2 8 A growing list of cases has limited
the application of the rule.2 9 Indeed, a new exception to the rule was
announced in United States v. Janis," decided the same day as Stone v. Powell.
The exclusionary rule also has been limited, in effect, by exceptions to the
3
general requirement for a warrant. 1
23. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
24. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
25. 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. Id. at 648-49, 656, 659.
28. See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412-24 (1971). A 1974 study of the critical commentary on the
exclusionary rule concluded, "A decision by the Supreme Court narrowing or
abolishing the exclusionary rule would not be surprising in view of the recent legal
commentary trend." 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 373, 384 (1974).
29. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (witness before grand
jury may not refuse to answer questions that are based on unlawfully obtained
evidence); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (defendant without proper
"standing" may not invoke exclusionary rule); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954) (illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach defendant).
One commentator has described Calandraas a "watershed" case because of its
emphasis on the exclusionary rule as a remedy rather than a constitutional right,
"... thereby removing the clearest authority for imposing the rule on the states."
Monaghan, The Supreme Court-1974Term, Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1975).
30. 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976). The Court held that the exclusionary rule would not
exclude from a federal civil tax proceeding evidence obtained by state criminal law
enforcement officers relying in good faith on a warrant that later proved defective, at
least in the absence of proof of federal participation in illegality.
31. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches are
permissible without warrant, but burden is on state to prove consent); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (police may seize without warrant evidence in
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/13
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The majority opinion in Stone v. Powell asserted that the exclusionary
rule is merely a judge-made remedy and that the Mapp holding was based
32
primarily on the belief that unlawful police conduct would be deterred.
The Court dismissed the judicial integrity argument, noting that it has not
been thought to prevent the use of unlawfully obtained evidence in some
circumstances.3 3 After asserting that the rule is "not a personal constitutional
right," the Court observed that because of the rule's deterrent purpose it has
not been extended to situations where the deterrence is attenuated or
non-existent.3 4 The Court concluded that the costs of entertaining exclusionary rule claims in habeas corpus proceedings outweigh the deterrent
effect; however, it adhered to the view that deterrent ". . . considerations
support the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions."3 5 The Court stated in a
footnote that it was unwilling to assume that state court judges are hostile to
constitutional rights and that they are not as capable as federal judges in
applying constitutional law. 6 Thus, where the state has provided a full and
fair review of an exclusionary rule issue, the issue may not be raised in
37
federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Chief Justice Burger concurred. In the earlier case of Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents he had proposed that Congress enact an administrative remedy to compensate victims of fourth amendment violations and had
plain view that was inadvertently observed in course of authorized intrusion); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (limited search of area within arrestee's immediate
control may be made incident to arrest even if police had time to obtain warrant);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ("stop and frisk" searches for weapons are permitted
where police officer reasonably concludes the subject may be armed and dangerous
and that preventive action to protect himself or others is necessary); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police in "hot pursuit" of armed, fleeing felon may
search for weapons without warrant); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
(warrant is unnecessary to search for contraband in vehicle that has been stopped).
32. 96 S. Ct. at 3046-47. However, substantial space was devoted in Mappto the
argument that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required. See, e.g., 367 U.S. at
648-49, 655-57.
33. 96 S. Ct. at 3047. The Court cited, interalia, United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); and Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
34. 96 S.Ct. at 3048-49. The Court cited United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974), and Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). See note 29 supra.
35. 96 S. Ct. at 3049-51. Among the costs cited by the court in ".

.

. weighing

the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to collateral
review. . ."were that the rule diverts attention from the main issue of guilt or
innocence, that the excluded evidence is usually reliable and often highly probative,
and that application of the rule often results in freeing the guilty. Id. at 3049-50.
36. Id. at 3051 n.35.
37. Id. at 3052. In authorizing habeas review where the state did not provide a
full and fair hearing of a search and seizure claim, the Court seemed to follow the
principle in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,426-27 (1963), that a basic function of habeas
corpus review is to protect due process rights. Full and fair hearing would seem to be
a fundamental due process right. Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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suggested the courts should not modify the exclusionary rule until Congress
acted.38 In Stone v. Powell, however, Chief Justice Burger stated it was clear
that alternative remedies would not be developed as long as the exclusionary
overruling or limiting
rule is enforced by the courts, so he favored judicially
39
the scope of the rule to prod legislative action.
Justice White stated in a dissenting opinion he did not agree with
barring exclusionary rule claims from habeas corpus proceedings. However,
he added he would join other justices in modifying the exclusionary rule to
prevent its application in cases where law enforcement personnel mistakenly
0
conduct an illegal search in good faith and on reasonable grounds.'
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a strong dissent.
Noting that the majority did not specifically overrule Mapp, Justice Brennan
asserted the exclusionary rule is a constitutional right and that, as a result,
the majority's holding as to habeas corpus review effectively rewrote the
jurisdictional statute enacted by Congress. 4' That statute provides for
habeas review ". . . on the ground that [the petitioner] is in custody in
42
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
Justice Brennan noted the Court's opinion seemed to say some constitutional rights are more worthy of protection than others and that less worthy
rights will be denied habeas corpus protection. 43 He added that there is a
need for a federal forum to protect federal rights, at least partly because
state judges are under popular pressure to uphold convictions of the
"morally unworthy" even if the fourth amendment rights of those convicted
44
have been violated.
The Court did not define "full and fair litigation" in reference to
state-court adjudication of search and seizure claims, but it referred in a
footnote 45 to Townsend v. Sain. Townsend used the same "full and fair"
language and discussed in some detail the factors to be used in deciding
46
whether to grant an evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding.
38. 403 U.S. 388, 420-22 (1971).
39. 96 S. Ct. at 3055.
40. Id. at 3071-73. Justice White stated:
When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good
faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is
later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent effect. The officers, if
they do their duty, will act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in the
future; and the only consequence of the rule as presently administered is
that unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact
and the truth-finding function of proceedings is substantially impaired or
a trial totally aborted.
Id. at 3073.
41. Id. at 3056-59.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1971).
43. 96 S.Ct. at 3061, 3065.
44. Id. at 3064-66.
45. Id. at 3052 n.36.
46. 372 U.S. 293, 313-18 (1963). See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/13
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Presumably, similar standards now are to be used in deciding whether to
entertain a claim of unlawful search or seizure in a federal habeas
proceeding.
The full-and-fair-litigation exception in Stone v. Powell may have a
special impact in Missouri. Missouri's strict "waiver" or "procedural default"
rule in search and seizure cases could result in Missouri prisoners obtaining
federal habeas review on the ground they did not receive a full and fair
hearing. In State v. Fields47 division two of the Missouri Supreme Court
stated the rule that search and seizure claims must be made by suppression
motion before trial and must be kept alive by timely objection at trial and by
inclusion in a motion for a new trial; otherwise direct appeal will not be
entertained on fourth amendment grounds. The only exception to this
procedural rule is where the defendant was surprised by the introduction of
the disputed evidence. Since the defendant in Fields did not file a suppression motion or preserve the issue by timely objection or in a motion for a new
trial, the court refused to consider the issue on direct appeal. 48 In a later state
collateral proceeding under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26, the court
held the defendant in Fieldswasprecluded from collateral attack on the basis
49
of the search and seizure issue because of his procedural defaults.
In Fields v. Swenson,50 a habeas corpus proceeding, the Eighth Circuit
upheld the conviction, but it did consider the search and seizure claim on the
merits. In holding that a procedural default in state courts would not
preclude federal habeas corpus review, the court relied on its earlier holding
in Frazierv. Roberts.-" Frazierinturn had relied on Fay v. Noia 2 and Townsend
s3
v. Sain.
Notwithstanding the federal position in the Fields case, the Missouri
Supreme Court en banc endorsed its divisional position and adhered to the
54
restrictive procedural default rule in the 1972 case of Schleicher v. State.
The 1974 case of State v. Yowell 55 confirms that Missouri and federal
courts still disagree on the issue. In Yowell the defendant raised his search
and seizure claim in a pre-trial suppression motion and in a motion for a new
trial, but failed to object at trial. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to
47. 442 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Mo. 1969).
48. Id. at 33.
49. Fields v. State, 468 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo. 1971).
50. 459 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1972).
51. 441 F.2d 1224 (8th Cir. 1971).
52. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
53. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
54. 483 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. En Banc 1972). The rule continues to be applied. See,
e.g., State v. Dayton, 535 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); State v. Hall, 534
S.W.2d 508 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); State v. Hunter, 530 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1975).
For a full discussion of Missouri's procedural default rules as they operate to bar
direct appeal and collateral review, see Anderson, Post-ConvictionRelief in MissouriFive Years Under Amended Rule 27.26, 38 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1973).
55. 513 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977
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consider the claim on direct appeal. In Yowell v. Wyrick,56 a habeas corpus
proceeding, the United States district court found there was no deliberate
bypass of state procedures, considered the search and seizure claim on the
merits and held the disputed evidence should have been excluded.
It thus seems clear that unless the Missouri Supreme Court relaxes the
strict procedural default rule, a number of exclusionary rule claims rejected
by Missouri courts will continue to be heard in federal habeas corpus
proceedings under the full-and-fair-litigation exception in Stone v. Powell.
Besides this obvious effect in Missouri, another clear result of Powell
would seem to be that far fewer search and seizure claims will reach the
federal courts, thus increasing the finality of convictions.58 Supreme Court
review still will be available through writ of certiorari from state supreme
courts, but in practical terms the chances of review are much smaller.59 The
result, according to Justice Brennan, is that denials of rights at the state level
will go unreviewed. 60 Even assuming the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right, it would seem that its enforcement needs to be monitored by
federal courts; 61 unless enforcement is made uniform through the federal
courts, the effect may be to give the fourth amendment different meanings
in different jurisdictions. The Court, however, seems to be giving state
62
courts a green light to apply search and seizure law as they see fit.
56. 387 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
57. Judge Seiler commented in his dissent in Schleicher v. State, 483 S.W.2d
393, 395 (Mo. En Banc 1972):
The basic question is, who is going to hear federal constitutional
search and seizure questions arising from Missouri state convictions? Our
divisional position is that it is to be done by the federal courts, Fields v.
State, 468 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. 1971). This leads to conflicts and does not
promote finality. If there is a defect in our state proceedings, it seems to me
we should handle it, rather than turning it over to the federal courts. A
defendant cannot constitutionally be convicted on evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and we accomplish little by declining
to meet the issue, particularly in a case where there is no evidence of an
abuse of process by the defendant.
(citations omitted).
58. For discussion of the issues involved, see Bator, Finality in CriminalLawand
FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
59. In 1974, 7,843 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the federal courts.
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OFTHE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1975 ANNUAL

REPORT 207 Table 24. In contrast, during its 1974 term, the United States Supreme
Court rendered 159 written opinions and 177 per curiam decisions but denied or
dismissed appeals or petitions for certiorari in 3,508 cases. These figures include
dispositions of other applications for review such as habeas corpus or mandamus.
The Supreme Court-1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 278 Table 11 (1975).
60. 96 S. Ct. at 3071.
61. There are substantial arguments concerning the desirability of a federal
forum to enforce federal law. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's dissent, id. at 3064-66; 52
N.C.L. REV. 633, 649-51 (1974); Comment, Developments in the Law--FederalHabeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1060-62 (1970).
62. In Wolff the Supreme Court allowed a clearly erroneous state interpretation of search and seizure law to stand without a remedy for the respondent. Notes 7,

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/13
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Beyond immediate effects, it is quite possible, as argued by Justice
Brennan, that Powell "... portends substantial evisceration of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction .. ."63 If, as Justice Brennan suggested, the
Court has decided that some constitutional rights are not as deserving of
protection as others, 64 it follows that the lesser rights are not worthy of
habeas corpus protection. The exclusionary rule, as a remedy for fourth
amendment violations, arguably is just such a lesser right and thus does not
merit habeas review in most cases. Such reasoning might be applied, for
instance, to the Miranda rule requiring law enforcement officers to warn
suspects of their rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present
during questioning. 65 The Miranda rule specifically was stated to be a
judge-made remedy and not a constitutional right per se-the same status
accorded the exclusionary rule in Stone v. Powell.
Further limitation or perhaps even abolition of the exclusionary rule
may be presaged in Stone v. Powell. Six of the nine justices concurred in the
opinion and a seventh, Justice White, said he would go along with modifying
the rule. Justice White's proposal to modify the exclusionary rule by preventing its application where law enforcement officers mistakenly engage in
an illegal search and seizure in good faith and on reasonable grounds66 may
indicate the direction the Court is headed. Chief Justice Burger hinted in
Powell that he would go along with this proposal.6 7 The same day Powell was
decided the Court seemed to take a step in this direction in United States v.
Janis; there the Court spoke of "good faith reliance" by state officers on a
68
warrant that later proved defective.
A major shortcoming of Stone v. Powell is the Court's downgrading of
the exclusionary rule in seeming reliance on the proposition that the rule
70
69
does not, in fact, deter police misconduct. While two earlier studies
supported that proposition, a more recent study 7' raises serious questions
about the validity of the earlier studies.
While the Court dismissed the "judicial integrity" argument for the
exclusionary rule, part of the rationale in Mapp v. Ohio should give pause to
persons who conceive the United States to be a nation of laws, not men:
11 supra. It seems the Court is saying that because the exclusionary rule is not a right
but rather a remedy, more flexibility may be allowed in its enforcement.
63. 96 S.Ct. at 3056.
64. Id. at 3061, 3065.
65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. 96 S. Ct. at 3073.
67. Id. at 3055.
68. 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976). See note 30 supra.
69. 96 S.Ct. at 3051.
70. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665 (1970); Spiotto, Searchand Seizure: An EmpiricalStudy of the Exclusionary Rule and
its Alternatives, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 243 (1973).
71. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in FailingHealth? Some New Dataand a Plea
Against a PrecipitousConclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1974).
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